Exchange reform, parallel markets, and inflation in Africa : the case of Ghana by Chhibber, Ajay & Shafik, Nemat
Policy,  Research,  and  Extemal  Affairs  LA)  If)  S  1
WORKING PAPERS
Office  of the  Vice  President
Development  Economics





and Inflation in Africa




This model using Ghanaian data shows that in the r)resence  of an
active parallel market, official devaluation does not cause infla-
tion because prices have already adjusted to the parallel ex-
change rate. Although structural factors were important in the
past, inflation  in Ghana has been  primarily  a monetary phenomiie-
non and the product  of weakness in the financial system in recent
years.
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Adjustment  programs  typically  involve  a  and simulations  using  a macroeconomic  model
complex  policy  package  that  includes  price  estimated  with Ghanaian  data.
liberalization,  devaluation,  and  trade policy  re-
forns  - together  with  public  enterprise  and  The model  rcsults  show  that therc  is no
fiscal reform,  including  reduccd  subsidies  and  direct  rclationship  bctween  thc official  exchange
rationalization  of  public  spending.  rate and  inflation;  prices  had  already  adjusted  to
the exchangc  rate prevailing  in parallel  markets.
A common  concem  in these reform  pack-
ages is the potential  inflationary  effects  of the  The results  also show  that official  devalu-
combination  of devaluation,  trade liberalization,  ation had  a positive  effect on Ghana's  budget.
subsidy  reduction,  and  price decontrol.  This  Revenue  improvements  came  from  three  chan-
issue is critical  in Africa,  where  inflation  has  nels:  the higher grant  aid disbursed  at a more
accelerated  in several  countrics,  particularly  depreciated  exchange  rate,  a reduction  in the
those  undergoing  adjustment.  subsidies  that had  accrued  to importers  through
an overvalued  excharige  rate,  and  an increase  in
Some  argue  that devaluation  - an important  export taxes as cocoa  farmners  increasingly
instrumenit in IMF  and World  Bank adjustment  marketed  their  output  through  official  channels.
programs  - is not necessarily  the best instru-
ment  for real exchange  rate devaluation,  given  The oflicial  devaluation  therefore  did not
its  inflationary  effccLs and  taking  into account  produce  higher  budget  deficits,  demand  pressure
the structure  of African  economies.  Some have  did not spill onto the parallel  market,  and the
criticized  INIF and  World  Bank programs  as  exchange  premium  narrowed  considerably.  The
leading  to teiC  so-called  "Latin  Americanization"  key to the success  of the program  was the
of Africa.  adequate  level of  loreign  financing,  combined
with a coherent  set of  liscal  policies.
In Ghana,  which  has  carried ouL one  of the
most  thorouglh structural  adjustment  programs  in  Chhibbcr  and  ShaFlk argue  that  although
Africa,  an increasingly  high inflation  rate has  inflation  had structural  causes  in the past, the ac-
been  attributed  to major  devaluations  of the  celeration  in recent  years  is primarily  a monetary
official  exchange  rate.  Chhipbersand  Shafik  phenomenon.  It also reflects  weakness  in the fi-
dispute  this  conclusion  based on careful  esting  nancial  system  that must  be tackled  to sustain
reform.
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Adjustment  programs  typically  i.  olve a complex  policy  package  which  include
some combination  of price liberalisation,  devaluation  and trade  policy  reforms,  as well
as  public  enterprise  and  fiscal  reform,  including  reduction  in  subsidies  and
rationalisation  of the  public  expenditure  program.  A common  concern  in these  reform
programs  is  the  potential  inflationary  effects  of  a  combination  of devaluation,  trade
liberalization,  subsidy  reduction  and  price  decontrol.  This  issue has  bewome critically
important  in the  African  context  where  inflation  has been accelerating  in a number  of
countries,  and  in  particular  in  those  undergoing  adjustment  programs.  This  is
particularly  evident  in  countries  which  are  not  members  of  the  CFA  Franc  zone.  In
a  recent  paper  Guillaumont  and  Guillaumont  (1989)  argue  that  devaluation  - an
important  instrument  in  IMF and  World  Bank adjustment  programs  - is not  necessarily
the  best  instrument  to  bring  about  real  exchange  rate  devaluation  given  its
infla:ionary  effects  and  taking  into  account  the structure  of African  economies.  IMF
and  World  Bank  programs  have  been  criticised  by  others  as  leading  to  the  so called
"Latin  Americanisation"  of  Africa. 1
This  paper  presents  a theoretical  framework  to address  the question  of exchange
rate  devaluation  in  the  presence  of  parallel  markets  in  Section  2.  It  then  uses  the
Ghanaian  data  to  empirically  estimate  a  model  in  Section  3  which  is  applied  to
analyze  policy  trade-offs  for  Ghana  in  Section  4.  The last  section  draws  together  the
lessons  from  the  Ghanaian  experience.  Ghana  has  carried  out  one  of  the  most
thorough  adjustment  programs  in  Africa.  Its  inflation  rate  is high  and  in recent  years
'The most recent critique has come from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).2
has  been  rising,  although  it  is  lower  than  during  the  worst  crisis  years.  Ghana's
average  annual  inflation  rate2 has  declined  considerably  since  1984  as  against  the
average  for  the  p.eriod  1976-83.  However,  tie  inflation  raie  has  risen  from  under  10
percent  per  annum  in  1985 to almost  40 percent  per  annum in  1987. Although  inflation
declined  to  a  little  over  30  percent  per  a,inum  in  1988,  there  remain  concerns  and
questions  about  its  underlying  causes  and  consequences.  Ghana  has  devalued  the
official  exchange  rate  on  average  by  well over  40  per  cent  per  annum  between  1983
and  1988 (See Table  1).  Ghana's  high  inflation  rate  has  been  attributed  to  the  large
devaluations  of the  official  exchange  rate.
This  paper  disputes  this  conclusions  about  the  inflationary  consequences  of
devaluation  based  on  careful  testing  and  simulations  vith  a  model  estimated  with
Ghanian  data.  The  model  simultaneously  determine.  the  rate  of  inflation  and  the
exchange  rate  premium  and  links  the  monetary  arnd real  sides  of the  economy  through
several  channels.  The  results  show  that  there  is  no  direct  relationship  between  the
official  exchange  rate  and  inflation;  prices  had  already  adjusted  to  the  shadow
exchange  rate  represented  by  the  exchange  rate  prevailing  in  parallel  markets.  The
results  also  show  that  the  Ghanian  official  devaluation  had  a  positive  effect  on  the
budget.  The  revenue  improvements  came  primarily  from  two  channels  --  (a)  from
higher  grant  aid  disbursed  at  a  more  depreciated  exchange  rate,  and  (b)  from  a
reduction  in  subsidies  to  importers  due  to  exchange  over-valuation.  The  official
devaluation  therefcre  did  not  result  in  higher  budget  deficits  and  as  a  result  excess
2As recorded by the official CPI.3
demand  pressure  did  n-t  s'  tl  onto  the  parallel  market  and  the  exchange  premium
narrowed  considerably.  The  key to  the success  of the  program  was the adequate  level
of foreign  financing,  combined  with  a coherent  set  of fiscal  policies.  The paper  shows
that  acceleration  in  inflation  in  recent  years  is  primarily  a  monetary  phenomenon,
reflecting  as well underlying  weakness  in the financial  system  which  need to  be tackled
to  sustain  the  reforms.
2.  The  Modei
The  approach  used  for  the  analysis  attempts  to  integrate  within  -ne
framework  three  transmission  mechanisms  for inflation  in Ghana:  via excessive  money
creation,  via  direct  cost  push  factors  such  as  the  cost  of  foreign  exchange  and  food
prices,  and  through  real  faciors.  WhUat  is often  missing  in  the analysis  of inflation  is
the  interactions  b,tween  these  transmission  mechanisms.  For  example,  changes  in
individual  prices  and  the  exchange  rate  have  budgetary  implications.  How  the
esulting  change  in  the  budget  gets  financed  in  turn  affects  debt  management  and
inflation.  Changes  in  monetary  and  credit  policy  have  consequences  for  the
availability  of working  capital  and  inve,tment  capital.  This  affects  the  level  of real
output  which  also  has  implications  for  the  management  of  inflation.  The  framework
set  up  in  this  paper  is  designed  to  quantify  these  interactions  in  the  presence  of
parallel  markets.4
The approach  adopted  here,  in some ways, synthesises  the monetarist  and  cost-
push  schools  of  inflation. 3 The monetarists  argue  that  cost-push  factors  such  as food
prices,  wage  or  exchange  rate  changes  can  only  cLuse a  shift  in  the  price  level  but
cannot  explain  how  it  translates  into  sustained  inflation.  For  this  to  happen,  one
needs monetary  accomodation,  without  which the inflationary  process  stalls.  While this
is no doubt  true,  we argue  that  although  money can be viewed as the  proximate  cause
of inflation,  cost-push  "actors  can  trigger,  directly  or  indirectly,  changes  in  the  rate
of  monetisation  and  in  the  velocity  of  circulation  of  money.  In  order  to  understand
the  inflationary  process,  it  is  necessary  to  disentangle  the  underlying  factors  which
ultimately  result  in  higher  growth  of domestic  liquidity.
The  focus  of  previous  analytical  work  in  this  area  has  been  on  the  interaction
between  exchange  rate  changes  and  inflation.  When the exchange  rate  is administered
it  acts  as  a  stabiliser  to  the  inflationary  process  but  at  the  cost  of  trade  imbalances
or  gtowth.4 This  happers  because  as  inflation  accelerates  due  to  high  fiscal  deficits
or  cost-push  factors  such  as  an  increase  in  food  prices,  the  real  exc,  aIge rate
appreciates.  Where  the  nominal  exchange  rate  is  allowed  tc  adjust  to  inflation
automatically  the inflationary  process  can become self-feeding. 5 Similar  problems  can
3 For a comprehensive treatment  of the monetarist and cost push analyses of infation  in
developing economies, see Kirkpatrick  and Nixson, (1976), Williamson (1985), Taylor, (1983).
See for example Khan and Lizondo (1986).
See Drazen and Helpman (1986) and van Wijnbergen (1988) for an analysis of this issue,5
arise  in  the  case  of  dual  exchange  rates'  when  the  government  attempts  Lo control
the cxchange  rate  changes  and  there  is a parallel  market  for  foreign  exchange.  As the
official  rate  remains  fixed  and  the  parallel  market  depreciates,  export  earnings
channelled  into  the  official  exchange  market  decline  and  the  duality  in  the  exchange
market  becomes  unsustainable.  With  a rising  parallel  market  premium  the implicit  tax
on exchange  rate  proceeds  in  the  official  market  increases.
When  the  government  attempts  to  unify  the  two  markets,  it  loses  the  implicit
tax.  Unless  accompanying  fiscal  changes  are  brought  about,  the  higher  fiscal  deficit
(due  to  the  loss  in  the  implicit  tax  on  foreign  exchange  transactions)  is  usually
monetised  leading  to  higher  inflation  which  could  lead  to  further  depreciation  of the
parallel  market  exchange  rate.  A  destabilising  process  from  unification  to  higher
deficits,  higher  inflation  and  an  increase  in  the  parallel  market  premium  can  be
established.  Pinto  (1988)  shows  the conditions  under  which  this  destabilising  process
can  develop.  This  has  obviously  not  happened  in  Ghana  as the  premium  between  the
two rates  has gradually  declined.  Moreover,  the government's  budgetary  position  has,
if  Lnything, imp.oved  due  to  the  devaluation  of the  official  exchange  rate  for  relsons
that  are  explained  in  later  sections.
6  See Dornbusch (1986) and Pinto (1988)6
2.1.  The Theoretical  Model
A segmcnted goods7 market  is  hypothesized.  There is  an official  market  at
which goods are available  at  a subsidised price (P 3).  In the parallel  market and  the
uncontrolled  legal market there are traded goods and non-traded goods.  Traded goods
are priced equal to foreign goods (Pr) converted at the parallel  exchange rate,  plus a
mark- up for the unit costs  of smuggling(s).$
PI = (I  + s) (ep. Pr).
We assume for expository  convenience that  s = 0
PX  = e.  + ;f  ;S  =  O.
A third  category  of  final  goods  transacted  in  the  parallel  market  are  non-traded
goods.  The production  of  these requires  labor  and  imported  inputs.  The foreigb
exchange for the purchase of imported inputs comes from official sources (e 0) as well
as  from the  parallel  market  (ed).  The following variable  mark-up  model is used to
explain non-traded  goods prices (Pz): 9
7Refers to goods and services.
The variable arguments of this unit costs function are the extent of policing and the
volume  of smuggling. A larger volume  of smuggling  decreases  the unit costs of smuggling.  The
unit costs of smuggling  are assumed  to be invariant to the level of demand  in the economy.
9See  Kalecki  (1971).7
P2 = (I  + u)  6eOp  . Pr  + (1-4)  eoPfll  (wp)  2
where  wp  denote  unit  labor  costs,  and  B  is  the  parallel  market's  share  of  foreign
exchange  used  for  imported  inputs.  The  size  of  the  mark-up  is  a  function  ^f  excess
demand  (ED)  in  the economy.
P2 = ao ED  +  a,  O[ep + Pj  +  al  (1.O)(^9  4  P,) +  a2 wp
The  average  rate  of  inflation  is  weighted  average  of  the  changes  in  prices  of
traded  (P,)  and  nontraded  (P2) goods  and  goods  at  controlled  prices  (P 3 ).
1=  +  X2P2 +  (1-As - X 2 P3
Equilibrium  in  the goods  market  is depicted  in Figure  I by the PP line.  In area
a,  there  is excess  supply  as  the mark-up  over  unit  costs  is  too  high.  Prices  must  fall
to clear  the  goods  market.  At b the  opposite  holds.  There  is excess demand  since the
mark-up  is  too  low  and  therefore  prices  must  rise  to  clear  the  market.  An  increase
in aggregate  demand  brought  about  by a larger  fiscal  deficit  shifts  PP to  P'P,  thereby
increasing  the  mark-up.  We assume  that  there  is  a surp!us  in  the  labor  market  such
that  an  increase  in  aggregate  demand  decreases  the  size of  the labor  surplus,  but  has
no  effect  on unit  labor  costs.
In  the  asset  markets,  there  is  a  domestic  asset  cedis,  and  a  foreign  asset,






Unit  Wage  Costs
. |~~~~~~~9
Overall  demand  is  a function  of total  financial  assets  which  are  defined  as:
A = M + epF
Where  M represents  the money supply,  ep is the parallel  exchange  rate,  F  iQ the
foreign  asset.  The  demand  for  foreign  exchange  is composed  of transactions  demand
and  portfolio  demand.
ep. Fd  =  h(ep/eo,  P/P 3 ,  A)  + j  [(i  - I  - ep),  A]
where  hi  <  0,  h2  >  0,  h3 >  °;  jl  <  °.  j2 > O°
The  supply  of  foreign  exchange  is  a  function  of  the  exchange  premium  the  real
exchange  rate  (r)  and  the  ratio  of  parallel  market  prices  to  the  controlled  official
price.
epF, = n(eV/e 0,  r,  P/P 3 )
where  n,  >  0,  n2  >  0,  n3  >  0.
An increase  in  P increases  the  transactions  demand  for  foreign  exchange  as the
difference  between  the  parallel  and  controlled  price  rises.  An  increase  in  P  also
increases  expectations  that  the  parallel  exchange  rate  will  depreciate.  This  leads  to
an  increase  in  the portfolio  demand  for  foreign  exchange,  given  domestic  and  foreign
interest  rates.  The  effect  on the  supply  of  foreign  exchange  is  also  positive,  but  on10
balance  the net  effect  is  an increase  in  demand.  A rise  in  ep is required  to  offset  this
net  demand  increase  and  restore  equilibrium.  A  rise  in  ep increases  the  supply  of
foreign  exchange  in  the  parallel  market.  The  direct  price  effect  of  ep on  Fd is
negative.  But  there  is  a  positive  wealth  effect.  If  the  substitution  effect  is  greater
than  the  wealth  effect,  the  overall  demand  effect  is  negative  and  the  ee  curve
unambiguously  slopes  upwards  (Figure  2c).  An  increase  in  ep  also  lowers  the
expectation  of  future  devaluation  ep  and  thereby  lowers  the  portfolio  demand  for
foreign  exchange.
We have  drawn  Figure  2a  to  show  equilibium  in  ep and  P.  In  quadrant  I  we
have  an  excess  supply  of  goods  but  an  excess  demand  for  foreign  exchange  so  that
equilibrium  is  restored  with  a  decline  in  P and  an  increase  in  ep.  In  quadrant  11 we
have  an  excess  supply  of  goods  and  foreign  exchange  and  both  P and  ep decline.  The
A
tatonnement  in  Quadrants  III  and  IV is  self-explanatory.
What  happens  if  the  official  exchange  rate  is devalued?  There  are  two  effects
which  could  potentially  go in opposing  directions.  First,  with  an official  devaluation
there  is  a  direct  cost-push  effect  which  shifts  PP  upwards  to  P'l.  In  addition,  there
are  budgetary  effects  which  determine  private  asset  holdings.  If  the  budget  deficit
improves  with  an  official  devaluation  and  the  rate  of  monetary  creation  declines,' 0
then  ee  curve  shifts  inwards  due  to  a  declining  wealth  effect.  The  PIP'  curve  also
shifts  inwards  as the  lower  excess demand  reduces  the average  level  of mark-up  in the
10Assuming  Ricardian equivalance does not hold.I]
Figure  2a:  EQUILIBRIUM  INFLATION  AND PARALLEL  EXCHANGE  RATES
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economy.  How  far  inside  P'Pl  shifts  depends  on  the  size  of  the  wealth  effect  on
demand  and  on  the  mark-up  in  comparison  with  the  higher  cost-push  effect  of  a
devaluation  (Figure  2b)."  As long  as  the cost  push  effect  of  the  official  devaluation
is  not  larger  than  PPl',  then  ep unambiguously  declines,  but  the  net  effect  on  P is  an
empirical  question  that  depends  on  the  relative  magnitudes  of  different  variables.
This  empirical  question  will  oe explored  in the simulation  model  that  follows.  On the
other  hand  if  the  official  devaluation  leads  to  a larger  budget  deficit  both  ee and  PP
shift  outwards  and  ep and  P rise  unambiguously.
A recent  model  (Azam  and  Besley,  1989)  also  simultaneously  determines  the
parallel  exchange  rate  and  the  CPI.  However,  their  model  addresses  somewhat
different  issues  from  those  discussed  in this  paper.  Their  focus  is on the  relative  price
of goods  smuggled  between  Ghana  and  Cote  d'lvoire,  changes  in the  official  producer
prices  and  the  impact  of  that  change  on  the  parallel  market  exchange  rate  and
inflation.  The  analytical  focus  of  our  model  is  on  the  joint  determination  of  the
exchange  premium  and  inflation  with  changes  in  the  official  exchange  rate.  We also
build  in  the  fiscal-monetary  side  and  the  rea!  sector.  The  policy  issues  we address
concentrate  on exchange  rate,  interest  rate  and  monetary  policy  and  their  impact  on
inflation  and  the  p;irallel  market  premium.  The  section  that  follows  presents  an
empirical  application  of  this  model  to  Ghana  and  is  followed  by  simulations  that
explore  the  implications  of a  number  of  policy  changes.
11We  verify econometrically in Section 3 that there is no cost-push effect for Ghana.13
3.  The  Empirical  Estimation  of  the  Model
The detailed  empirical  model  with  all  the equations  and  identities  is  presented
in  Table  2.  The model  is divided  into  four  blocks:  Inflation,  Parallel  Exchange  Rate,
Money  and  Fiscal  and  the  Real  Side.
3.1.  Block  A:  Inflation
Inflation  is  hypothesised  to  have both  monetarist  and  cost-push  determinants.
The overall  rate  of inflation  is a weighted  average  of traded  (P),  non-traded  (P2) and
controlled  (P3)  prices  (Equation  2:1).  For  traded  goods,  the  change  in  the  domestic
price  is equal  to  the  change  in  foreign  price  plus  the change  in  the nominal  exchange
rate  (Equation  2.2).  For  goods  that  are nontraded,' 2 prices  are determined  by a mark
up  over  unit  labor  costs  (wp)  and  the  cost  of  imported  inputs  (mc)13  (Equation  2.3).
The  size  of the  mark  up  depends  on  the  degree  of  excess  demand  (ED)  that  exists  in
the economy.  Changes  in  unit  labor  costs  result  from  deviations  of wage growth  from
productivity  growth  in  the  economy.  Following  Corbo  and  McNelis  (1987),  the
assumption  is  made  that  changes  in  import  costs  are  the  sum  of  changes  in  foreign
prices  and  the  nominal  exchange  rate  (Equation  2.4).
'2 Nontraded here refers to  both goods that  it is not feasible to  trade,  such as land, and
goods that  are de  facto  nontradables,  such as items protected  by prohibitive  tariffs  and/or
quotas.
1' Bruno, 1979; Gordon,  1975; and Corbo, 1985.14
Table 1: GNANA.- ECONOMIC  INDICATORS
Mid-1967  Populaion  (MIls.)  13.6
1987  rar Capita  GNP  In US$:  390
A. Shares of Grosr. Domestic  Product  B. Growth Rate*(%  per annum)
(prom  current  price  dlata)  (trom constant  price  data)
1965  1973  1960  1goe  1967  1988  1985-73 1973480 1980.7  1967  1988
Gross Domesilc  Product  rn.P.  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  3.4  -0.3  1.4  4.8  6.0
Not  Indirec Taxes  12.8  8.0  3.6  ..  . .. *
AgrICUltUre  43.5  49.0  57.9  47.8  506  . 4.'5  0.0  0.0"  0.0  3.6
Industry  18.6  18.6  11.9  17.2  15.9  .. 4.3  -3.4  0.1  11.3  10.3
(o1  whlich  Manulacturing)  9.8  11.7  7.8  11.2  9.9  .. 6.5  .2.8  1.3  10.0  9.3
services  37.9  32.4  30.2  35.0  33.5  .. 1.1  0.6  4.2  9.4  7.8
Resource  Balance  -9.6  5.1  40.7  -3.3  -2.9  -3.8  0..  .. j  0~  i  3
Exports  of  GNFS  17.1  21.4  8.5  19.2  20.6  17.68.  . . . .
imports ofGNFS  26.7  16.4  9.2  22.5  23.6  21.6  -7.8  -3.6  -0.3  18.4  4.5
Total  Expenditures  109.6  94.9  100.7  103.3  102.9  10368  2.2  0.5  1.4  5.9  6.1
TotlConsufnPlIon  91.7  85.9  95.1  93.7  92.2  94.6  2.8  0.8  1.3  4.7  5.4
Private  Consurnption  77.3  75.0  83.9  82.6  81.6  86.5  2.9  0.0  1.7  5.4  5.1
Genersi  Governmntn  14i.  10.9  11.2  11.2  10.6  8.2  1.1  8.4  -1.6  0.0  6.7
Gross  Domestic  Winvestment  17.9  9.0  5.6  9.6  10.9  12.5  -3.5  -3.6  3.2  21.3  16.2
Fixed  Investment  ..  7.7  6.1  9.5  10.7  .. 3.6  .0.8  2Z5  21.4
ChangesIn  Stocks  ..  1.4  .0.5  0.1  0.1  . . .
Gross  Domestic  Saving  8.3  14.1  4.9  6.3  7.9  8.6  12.3  -7.7  1.8  3.0  13.0
Net  Factor  income,  -1.3  .0.8  -0.4  -2.4  -2.7  -2.7  . .
Net  Current  Transfers  ..  0.2  0.0  1.3  4.2  114..  8..  - 2- 
Gross  National  Saving  . 13.1  4.5  5.1  9.3  .. 12  -80  .7  27  59
In mIillions  of LCUS
(at constant  1980  prices)  1965  1973  1960  1988  1987  1988
Gross  Domestic  Provluct  35.594  43.174  42,652  44.335  46.463 49.260  3.4  -0.3  1.4  4.6  6.0
Capacity  to Import  5.190  5,898  3.628  2.223  3.730  3.620  40.6  4.1I  -1.6  67.8  -3.0
Terms ofTrade Adlustment  -2.558  -1,456  0  .1,189  -684  -800..  .
Gross  Domestic  income  33,036  41,718  42.852  43.146  45,779  48,460  3.4  0  .'2  1.3  6.1  5.9
Gross  National  Product  35.443  43.033  42,670  43.99.4 45.910  48.560  3.4  -0.3  1.4  4.4  5.8
Gross  Nationai  Income  32,8.85 41,577  42.670  42,806  45,226  47,760  3.4  0.2  1.2  5.7  5.6
(1980.-100)  inflation  Rates  (%  p.a.)
C. price Indices  1980  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1965.73  1973.80  1980.87  1987  1988
Consumer  Prices  (IFS  6.4)  100.0  824.2  909.  1  1132.5  1583.3  . 6.4  60.3  45.7  39.8  31.4
Whoiesaie  Prices  (IFS  63)  100.0  844.3  1319.9  2158.6  3051.4  . 8.6  41.4  67.6  41.4
implicit  GDP  Deflator  100.0  670.8  812.6  1152.6  1612.4  2127.5  8.1  45.4  48.3  39.9  31.9
Implicit  Expenditures  Deft.  100.0  678.2  828.7  1212.9  1665.4  2210.0  7.7  44.8  48.9  37.3  32.7
D. Other Indicators:
GrowTAh  Rates(%  p-a.):  -1965.73 1973.80  1980-87
Populatilon  2.3  1.8  2.6
LAbor  Force
Gross  Nalt.  tncome  p.c.  1.1  .1.6  .2.1
Private  Consumption  p.c.  0.6  .1.8  -1.7
import Elasticity:
imports  (G+  NFS)  /GDP(rmp)  -2.3  13.6  -0  2
marginal  Savings  Rates:
Gross  National  Saving  . -348.9  310  8
Gross  Domestic  Saving  39.9  -424.7  80 3
ICOR  (period  averages):  ..  -73  4  5.3
Shiare  of Total  1965  1973  1980  1987
Labor  Force  In:
Agriculture  61.0  57.6  55  8
InduStry  15 3  17.0  17  8
Services  23.7  25.4  26.4
Toala  100  0  100 0  100 0IS
Table  I  ...  (contd.)
Ghana
Share ot GOP  (%)  Growth  Rates
I. Budget  1980  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1980-84  1988  1987  1988
Current Receipts  ..  8.0  11.3  12.4  13.4  12 2  ..  63.2  58.3  30.8
Current Expmnditures  . 8.6  11.2  11.9  10.8  102  58.2  32.5  37.8
Cuffent  Budget Balance  ..  -0.6  0.1  0.5  2.6  1.9
Capital  Receipts  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..
Capnal ExpendItures  ..  2.5  4.2  7.3  7.8  8.3
Adluslm*nts  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..
Oversiil DefIci  ..  -3.1  -4.1  -5.5  -4.9  .5.5
Oftcl  Caplal  Grants  . 0.4  0.6  1.5  1.7  1.4  ..
Extemal Borrowing  (net)  ..  ..  ..  .
Domestlc Non-Bank Ftnancing  . 0.5  0.3  0.6  0.6  ..
Domesilc Bank  Fnancing  ..  0.7  0.9  0.5  *1.0  -0.7
OToerO-.rde  1980  1984  1965  19t6  198?  1988
Merch. Expots  Prce  Index  100.0  48.5  44.1  46.1  47.0  47.0
Merch.  hpot  Pric  Index  100.0  120.5  120.5  109.7  114.0  117.5
Mereh  Tems  of Trade  100.0  40.2  36.6  42.0  41.2  40.0
US$ millions (at current prices)
H. lbance  of Payments  1980  1984  1985  1986  198?  1968
EXPOEsOfGoods & NFS  1.210  610  670  813  906  943
Mehndise  (FOB)  1.104  566  632  773  827  841
Non-Facor  ServIces  107  44  38  40  79  103
ImportsOfGoods&NFS  1.175  696  836  940  1.189  1,289
Mrchandise  (FOB)  908  533  669  713  952  1 110
NarnFactor Services  266  163  168  228  238  179
Resource Balanee  36  -86  -166  -127  -283  -346
Net Factor income  -86  -115  111  t  111  -132  -135
Onterest  per DRS)  30  30  31  43  5sq  73
Net  Current  Transfers  -3  21  33  72  202  172
(workers remmtances)  1  5  0  1  1
Curr A/C Bal before Off. Transf  -54  -180  -244  -166  -224  -325
Net Officlal  Transfers  83  141  110  123  123  174
CufrA/C  Bat  afterOIf.  Transf  29  -39  -134  -43  -101  -151
Long-Term  Capital Inflow  93  203  38  135  220  221
Direct Investment  16  2  6  4  5  20
Net ILT Lcans (DRS data)  127  46  107  269  241  230
Other  LT Inflow (Net)  -50  155  -74  -138  -26  -34
Total Other  Iems  (net)  -218  -232  157  -122  -30  68
NotSher.  TenmCapnai  -118  -99  93  -41  -42  69
CaplatFlowM  N.E.I.  0  0  0  0  0  0
Erors  and Omisslons  -100  -133  63  -41  12  2
Changes In Net Reterves  95  94  -128  -46  -180  -125
Net Credtn  from the IMF  -31  214  122  16  -25  -45
Other Reserves Changes  126  -'20  -249  -62  -155  -80
As Share of GDP
Resource Balance  0.8  -2.0  -3 7  -2.2  -5.6  -6.7
Interest Paymenis  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  1.1  1.4
Current Account  Balance  -1.2  -4.1  -5.4  -2.9  -4.4  -6.3
Memorandum  Items:
Reserves  excl. Gold (mil. USS)  180  302  479  513  195  221
Reserves Incl. Gold (mil. USS)  330  437  552  624  332  310
OftI  X-Rale (LCUs/USS)  2.75  35.34  54.05  89.29  147.00  202.00
Index Real Eff. X-R Base 1980  100.00  72.15  52.45  30.24  23.34  22.19
GOP (millions of current  US$)  4,445  4,419  4,504  5.723  5.075  5.14516
Table  2: 1'HE  MODEL
A.  Inflation
2.1.  P1=  A  +  42  +  (I-=x  -
*  *  ,
2.2.  P1 =  Pf+  e
2.3.  P2 U + [a,wp  + a2 nc
2.4.  mic  =  + e
2.5.  U  =  f(ED);  f,  > o
2.6.  ED  =  log  M/p  - log  Md/p
2.7.  log  Md/p  =  a(log  y, i,  P);  a1 > O,  8 2 <  ,8,  <0
2.8.  e  =  (1,)  p
B. Parallel  Exchange  R&ate
2.9.  F  =  Ft +Fp
2.10.  epFt =  h(eW/e 0,PIP3,A);  h,  < 0,  h2 0
2.11.  epFP  =  j[i-l*  - ;"d  * A; j= > O
2.12.  ep.  Fs  =  n (eW/e 0,r,P/P3);  n,  >  0, n2 >  0,  n3>  0.
C.  Money  and  Fiscal
2.13.  M2 =  m +  R
2.14.  R  =  COG+NFA+OA
2.15.  COG  =  COG-'+  GBB
2.16.  GBB  =  GDEF  - GFB  - GDB.
2.17.  GDEF  =  GEXP  - GREV.17
2.18.  GREV  =  CUDT  + EXPT  + GOREV  + AID.
2.19.  CUDT  =  IMPQ.Pf.eO.tm
2.20  EXFT  =  EXPQ.Px.eotx.
2.21.  AID  =  $AID.eo.
2.22.  GEXP  =  WBILL+SUBS+INTD+INTF+GOVI+GOEXP
2.23.  WBILL  =  Wg.Lg.
2.24.  INTF  =  FDEBT.if.e 0.
2.25.  FDEBT  =  FDEBT.,  + GFB/eo.
2.26.  INTD  =  DDEBT.i.
2.27.  DDEBT  =  DDEBT.,  + GDB
2.28.  PCRED  =  PCRED.1 +  APCRED
2.29.  APRCED  =  ATCRED - A  OCRED
D.  Real  Side
2.30.  gy  ao +  a,gk  + a2gPoP-
2.31.  K  =  Kp +  Ks.
2.32.  Kp  =  Kp, (1-8)  + Ip.
2.33.  Kg  =  Kg., (1-8)  + Ig.
2.34.  Ip  =  f(PCRED)
where
AID  =  Foreign  Aid  in  Cedis
$AID  =  Foreign  Aid  in  US dollar
COG  =  Government  borrowing  from  the  Central  Bank
CUDT  =  Customs  Duty  Earnings
DDEBT  =  Domestic  Debt
eo  =  Official  Exchange  Rate  Cedis/USS
ep  =  Parallel  Exchange  Rate  Cedis/USS18
e  =  Weighted  average  Exchange  Rate
ED  =  Excess  Demand
EXPT  =  Export  Tax  Revenue
EXPQ  =  Export  Volume
F  =  Foreign  Exchange  in  Parallel  Market
FT  =  Transactions  Demand  for  Foreign  Exchange  in  Parallel
Market
Fp  =  Portfolio  Demand  for  Foreign  Exchange  in  Parallel  Market
PDEBT  Foreign  Debt
GBB  =  Government  borrowing  from  the  Central  Bank
GDEF  =  Fiscal  Deficit
GFB  - Government  Foreign  Borrowing
GDB  =  Government  Domestic  Borrowing
GEXP  =  Government  Expenditure
GREV  =  Government  Revenue
GOVI  =  Government  Investment  (Nominal)
GDEXP  =  Other  Government  Expenditure
gy  =  Growth  Rate  of real  output
gk  =  Growth  rate  of capital  stock
gPoP  =  Growth  rate  of  population
IMPQ  =  Import Volume
INTF  =  Interest  on  Foreign  Debt
INTD  =  Interest  on  Domestic  Debt
=  Domestic  Interest  Rate  on  Six Month  Deposits
if  =  Foreign  Interest  rate
Ip  =  Real  Private  Investment
Ig  =  Real  Public  Investment
K  =  Capital  Stock
Kp  =  Private  Capital  Stock
Kg  =  Government  Capital  Stock
Lg  C-overnment  Labor  Gro  th
M  =  Money  Supply  (M2);  in,  ules  30-day  Deposits
Md  =  Money  Demand
mc  =  Costs  of  Intermediate  imports
P  CPI
Pi  =  CPI for  Traded  Goods
P2 =  CPI for  Non-traded  Goods
P 3 =  CPI  for  Controlled  Goods
PCRED  =  Credit  to  Private  Sector  (Real)
Pf  =  Import  Price  Index
Px  =  Export  Price  Index
r  =  Real  Official  Exchange  Rate
TCRED  =  Total  Credii  (Real)
tm  =  Customs  Duty  rate
tx  =  Export  Tax  Rate
wp  =  Unit  Labor  Costs
wg  =  Government  Wage Level
WBILL  =  Government  Wage Bill19
Specifyina  Excess  Demand
Two different  approaches  to  modelling  excess  demand  in the  goods market  were
tried.  The  first  uses  Walras'  law  to  assume  that  excess  demand  in  the  goods  market
is  equivalent  to  excess  supply  in  the  money  market."4 This  implies  that  the
substitution  between  money and  goods is far  more important  than  that  between  money
and  other  financial  assets.  This  is  a  plausible  assumption  in  a  developing  economy
with  a  relatively  shallow  financial  system  characterized  by administered  interest  rates
and  a  limited  number  of  financial  assets.15  It  is  an  appropriate  assumption  in  the
case  of Ghana.
The  excess  supply  of  money  is  specified  as  the  log  difference  of  real  money
supply  to  real  money  demand  (Equation  2.6).  A standard  money  demand  function  is
hypothesized  and  Y is  real  income,  i is the  rate  of interest  on  deposits,  and  Pe is the
expected  rate  of  inLlation.1 6
A  second  approach  that  was tried  was to  use  the  ratio  of  capacity  output  to
actual  output.  Capacity  output  was  defined  as  the  multiple  of  an  average  output-
capital  ratio  to  the  capital  stock.  This  approach  gave  poor  econometric  results  and
was rejected.
4  See Chhibber et al,  1989 for further discussion of the relevance of this  assumption.
'5  This argument was put forth  by Khan, 1980.
16  Mid-year (June) M2 figures were used for money supply and the six month deposit rate
was used for the interest  rate.  The price indices used were also June figures.20
Wago-Push  Ilnflation
Changes  in  wages  can  have  inflationary  consequences  when  they  exceed  the
growth  in  labour  productivity,  i.e.  a  'wage  gap"  exists."  In  order  to  assess  this
channel  for  the  acceleration  of  inflation,  it  was  necessary  to  construct  an  index  of
nominal  wages  in the  economy.  This  was done  by constructing  a  weighted  average  of
the  average  mid-year  wages  paid  in  the  public  and  private  sectors  over  the  1965-87
period.  The  weights  varied  over  time  depending  on  the  relative  shares  of  formal
sector  workers  employed  in  the  public  and  private  sectors.  The  resulting  wage  index
may be  slightly  biased  upwards  since  it  does  not  include  informal  sector  wages,  for
which  there  is no  available  data.
Real  wages  have  not  moved  monotonically  in  Ghana  (Appendix  Figure  5).
After  a  peak  in  1975,  the  trend  was  steadily  downward:  consequently  it  was  not
plausible  to  assume  that  productivity  followed  a  time  trend,  in  the  Ghanaian  case.
Regressions  of  real  wage  g: owthl1  on  a  constant,  a  time  trend,  and  a  lagged
dependent  variable  always  resulted  in  insignificant  coefficients.  Instead,  it  was
necessary  to  analyze  labour  productivity  more  directly  in  order  to  evaluate  the
17 Bruno and Sachs define the wage gap which causes inflation as the difference between
wages and productivity.  They use two different measures of productivity for their  empirical
work on the OECD countries: (1) average labour productivity at cyclical peaks interpolated  at
constant  exponential  rates,  and  (2) labour  productivity  as a  function  of  a  time  trend  and
unemployment.  Bruno and Sachs, 1985, p.  179,
l  Real wage growth was defined as: WGPG = log W-log W(-l) - log P - log P(-1).21
inflationary  consequences  of  the  wage gap.  The proxy  used  for  labour  productivity
was  the  growth  rate  of  real  output  per  capita."g  The  following  equation  was
estimated:
WGPG  = -0.05  CONSTANT  + 1.81 (GDP/POPG).
(0.84)  (1.83)
The  residual  that  resulted  from  this  regression  was defined  as  the  "wage  gap."  The
coefficient  on  labor  productivity  is  not  significantly  different  from  unity.
Econometric  Estimation:  Inflation
Table  3  contains  the  results  of  econometric  estimates  of  the  reduced  form
iuflation  equation  for  Ghana.2 °  All  of  the  regressions  are  two  stage  least  squares
estimates. 21  The model  performs  well with  al!  of  the variables  significant  and
19 Data are not available for the actual labour force in Ghana.  Figures from censuses for
various years (1960, 1970, 1984, and 1987) are available and there is a series for formal sector
employment defined as units employing ten or more workers.  Because of these data constraints,
it  seemed more plausible  to  assume a  constant  participation  rate  of the population  than to
assume a constant rate  of formal sector participation,  which one would expect to increase over
time.  This is  confirmed by the  fairly steady participation  rates  observed across censuses
reported in Killick, 1978, p. 77.  Consequently, the proxy used for labour productivity was real
output as a share of the total  population in Ghana.  Note also that  since real output includes
the productivity  of the capital  stock,  it  is necessary to  assume Cobb-Douglas technology to
justify  the use of output per capita as a proxy for labour productivity.
20 Mid-year (June) observations were used for the series for M2, the consumer price index,
+ the official + parallel  market exchange rates.  All real values are in  1980 prices.
21 Because the R2 is not reliable in two stage least squares estimates, they are not reported
here.  Instead, the Chi2(B=O)  statistic  is reported as a measure of the goodness of fit of the
equation.Table 3: INFLATION  EQUATIONS WITH WAGE VARIABLES, 1965-87
Equation  Constant  e0 + Pr  Log (M/P-1)  Log y  i  W  Wg  p-1  CHi 2 DW
3.1  18.8822  0.0887  0.3939  -1.9721  0.0372  0.3447  0.4551  10.09  1.83
(1.64)  (0.28)  (2.34)  (1.76)  (1.92)  (0.64)  (1.85)
3.2  13.6146  0.4812  0.4420  -1.5027  0.0315  -0.1185  0.4404  12.45  1.90
(1.47)  (2.04)  (3.9'3)  (1.68)  1.00)  (0.26)  (1.65)
All equations  were estimated  by two stage least  squares  using PCGIVE.  The instruments  used were lagged values of inflation,  output,
money supply, interest  rates,  import prices at  the official and parallel  market exchange rates,  the parallel  market premium, the wage gap,
and real  public sector wages.
e  :  Official  Exchange Ratce (Cedis/USS)
Pr  Foreign  Price Index in US$
M  Money Supply (M2)
y  Real GDP
X  :  Six-month  Deposit Rate
W  :  Real Wage Minus Productivity
Wg  :  Real Public Sector Wages
P1 :  Lagged Inflation23
appropriately  signed  with  the exception  of the  unit  wage costs.  This  is not  surprising
in  Ghana  given  that  a verv  small  share  of  the  labor  force  is  in the  formal  sector  and
unionized  and  that  there  has  been tremendous  downward  pressure  on wages  in  recent
years.22
An alternative  argument  might  be that  it  is  public  sector  wages  that  rise  at  a
23 faster  rate  than  productivity  and  th'erefore  fuel  iniflation.  Given  the  difficulties
in  measuring  public  sector  productivity,  it  has  been  assumed  to  be  constant  so  only
the  growth  rate  in  public  sector  wages  has  been  included  in  the  inflation  equation.
The results  reported  in equation  3.2 of  table  3 also  confirm  that  public  sector  wages
did  not  contribute  to  the  inflationary  process  in  Ghana.  This  is  consistent  with  a
declining  trend  in  real  public  sector  wages  over  much  of the  high  inflation  period.
Equation  4.1  in  Table  4 drops  the  wage  variables  as  there  is  no  evidence  that
wages  were  an  important  factor  in  overall  price  determination  in  Ghana.  The
resulting  equations  are  very  robust  with  significant  coefficients  and  diagnostic
statistics.  Expected  inflation  was specified  using  both  perfect  foresight  and  adaptive
lagged  inflation.  The empirical  results  indicate  that  lagged  inflation  worked  better.24
22 However, union activity is not totally absent in Ghana.  Aboagye describes the increase
in  the rise in the numbei of industrial  disputes in Ghana from 10 in  1972 to 43 in  1974 when
rising inflation eroded real wages.  Aboagye, 1979, p.  14.
23  Note  that  this  distinction  between private  and  public sector  wages may be  slightly
artificial in the Ghanaian case for a number of reasons.  The statistics for private sector wages
include some parapublic sector wages and private sector wages respond in part to movements in
public sector wages.
24 The relationship between price controls and inflation was also explored econometrically,
but  the results were inconclusive.  The findings are available from the authors.Table 4:  INFLATION EQUATIONS, 1965-88
0  S~~~~0a
Equation  Constant  + P  ep +  Log (M/P-1)  Log y  i  P  CHi2 D.W.
4.1  14.3193  0.2909  0.4036  -1.5513  0.0390  0.3209  22.62  1.80
(2.07)  (2.03)  (3.80)  (2.30)  (2.97)  (2.17)
4.2  8.8233  0.1649  0.3566  -1.0049  0.0258  0.3872  69.60  1.39
(1.97)  (4.52)  (6.90)  (2.32)  (3.25)  (5.22)
4.3  9.1805  0.0-91  0.1474  0.3832  -1.0533  0.0281  0.5596  42.74  1.35
(1.80)  (0.39)  (1.60)  (5.31)  (2.12)  (2.86)  (3.32)
All equations  were estimated  by two stage  least squares  using PCGIVE.  The instruments  used were lagged values of inflation,  output,
money supply, interest  rates,  import  prices at  the official  parallel  market exchange rates,  and the parallel  market  premium.
C.  :  Official Exchange Rate  (Cedis/USS)
e,>  :  Parallel  Market  Exchange Rate  (Cedis/US$)
Pr  :  Foreign Price Index in USS
M  :  Money Supply (M2)
y  :  Real GDP
i  :  Six-month Deposit  Rate
P,  :  Lagged Inflation25
Inflation  and  Exchange  Rates
The cost-push  literature  posits  the  relationship  between  the  exchange  rate  and
inflation  operates  through  the  inelastic  demand  for  imports  and  inelastic  supply  for
exports  that  characterize  many  developing  economies.25 Because  of  such  rigidities,
a  devaluation  implies  cost  increases  for  importers  without  a concommilant  rise  in the
income  of exporters,  at  least  in  the  short  run.
Econometric  evidence  on the  relationship  between  inflation  and  exchange  rates
is presented  in  table  4.  Equation  4.3  includes  both  inflation  in  the domestic  price  of
foreign  goods  calculated  at  the  official  exchange  rate  (eN+Pf) and  the price  of foreign
goods  calculated  at  the parallel  market  exchange  rate  (ep + Pf).  Both  coefficients  are
insignificant,  which  may  reflect  multicollinearity  since  the  correlation  coefficient
between  the  variables  is  high.  However,  when either  representation  of  the  domestic
price  of  foreign  goods  is  included  on  its  own,  it  is highly  significant.  Equation  4.1
in  table  4 shows  the  significance  of  the  import  price  index  at  the  official  exchange
rate  (e0 +Pf).  Equation  4.2  includes  only  the parallel  market  version  of import  prices
(ep +  Pf)  along  with  the  basic  inflation  equation.  Again,  the  coefficient  is  highly
significant.
These  results  would  seem  to  imply  that  since  both  the  official  and  parallel
market  rates  matter,  the  overall  rate  of inflation  is a weighted  average  of changes  in
23  If  the imports  are composed largely of  capital  goods and intermediates for  which no
domestic substitutes  exist, the economy is particularly  vulnerable to  cost-push inflation  from
import  prices.26
both  exchange  rates  since the market  is segmented  and clearing  at  two different  prices.
In order  to  test  this  hypothesis,  a  grid  search  was conducted  using  varying  values  of
it to  determine  whether  the overall  fit  of the  inflation  equation  improved  with  varying
weights  on a composite  foreign  price  variable.  The result  was that  the fit  deteriorated
as the  relative  weight  of the official  exchange  rate  increased.  This  was true  even when
the sample  period  for  the  grid  search  was restricted  to  the  pre-1983  period.  This  is an
indication  that  consumer  prices  reflected  the  shadow  price  of  foreign  exchange  even
during  the  period  prior  to  the  introduction  of the  auction.26  This  is  also  confirmed
by  equation  4.3  in  which  both  the  official  and  parallel  market  exchange  rates  are
included  in  the  inflation  equation  and  the  parallel  rate  is  far  more  significant.  The
inflation  equation  was also  estimated  recursively  and  the results  of the  one-step  Chow
tests  indicated  that  the  parameters  were  stable  at  the  1% confidence  level  over  the
entire  sample  period.
To  summarize,  the  results  on  the  determinants  of  inflation  indicate  that  the
relevant  cost-push  variable  is  the  shadow  cost  of  foreign  exchange  measured  by the
parallel  market  exchange  rate.  This  is important  in  the  context  of  the  comparative
static  exercises  in  Section  2.  To recapitulate  an official  devaluation  leads  to  a slower
rate  of  parallel  exchange  rate  depreciation.  But  the  effect  on  infiation  was
unambiguous  if  there  was a direct  cost-push  effect  of official  devaluation.  Since this
cannot  be empirically  verified  in  Ghana,  the  effect  on  inflation  of official  exchange
rate  devaluation  must  be  unambiguously  negative.
26 This is consistent with the method by which the CPI is compiled in Ghana.  Officials at
the Governmcnt Statistical  Service stated that they monitor prcvailing market prices, rather than
official controlled prices, in constructing  the consumer price index.27
Other  results  in this  sub-section  are that  wage-push  inflation  was not  important
in  Ghana.  The  coefficient  of  the  excess  demand  variable  measured  by  the  excess
supply  of real  money  is also  significant.  Monetary  growth  therefore  is a key  variable
in  determining  the  pace of  inflation  but  should  be viewed in  conjunction  with  factors
which  affect  the  desire  to  hold  money.  Factors  which  affect  money  demand  are  real
income  growth  and  interest  rates.  A rise  in  income  raises  money  demand  lowering
inflation.  An  increase  in  the  six-month  deposit  rate  lowers  money  demand  which
includes  only  up  to  20-day  deposits.  This  in  turn  leads  to  higher  inflation.  The
question  then  arises  as to  what  determines  the  parallel  market  exchange  rate,  the  rate
of monetary  growth  and  the  level  of  real  activity  in  the  economy.  We turn  now to  an
analysis  of  these  factors.
3.2.  BLOCK  B:  Exchange  Rate  Premium
We estimate  a dynan.ic  variant  of the theoretical  model  in  Section  2 to  identify
the factcrs  which  determine  the differential  between  the official  exchange  rate  and  the
parallel  market  exchange  rate.  The growth  in the  parallel  market  premium  is defined
as:
ed  =  C0 - ep.
The  demand  for  foreign  exchange  in  the  parallel  market  is  divided  into  a
transaction  demand  and  a portfolio  demand  (Equation  2.9).  The transactions  demand28
depends  on  exchange  premium  and  the  degree  of  price  controls  (Equation  2.10).  In
determining  their  asset  portfolio  demand,  agents  choose  between  holding  Ghanian
cedis  and  foreign  exchange  (ep.F).  The  relative  shares  of cedis  and  foreign  exchange
in  the  public's  asset  holdings  will  depend  on  the  relative  returns  between  cedis  and
foreign  exchange.  This  will depend  on domestic  and  foreign  interest  rates  and  the rate
of  expected  depreciation  in  the  parallel  market  (Equation  2.11).
The  supply  of  foreign  exchange  to  the  parallel  market  will  depend  on  the
exchange  premium,  the  real  official  exchange  rate,  as  well  as the  difference  between
prices  in  the  parallel  market  and  controlled  prices.  The  resulting  empirical  model
which determines  the parallel  market  exchange  rate  is based  on the supply  and  demand
factor.s for foreign  exchange  in  the parallel  market.  This  model  posits  that  the parallel
market  premium  depends  on the real  effective  official  exchange  rate,  the  depreciation-
adjusted  interest  differential  and  the  stock  of  real  money  balances  in  the  economy.'7
This  model  was  estimated  for  Ghana  using  the  cedi/$  exchange  rate  in  the
parallel  market  on  the  left  hand  side  and  the  real  official  exchange  rate,29  the
depreciation-adjusted  interest  rate  differential  between  Ghana  and  the  United
2A  version  of  this  model  was first  used  by  Dornbusch et  al  (1986) for  Brazil  and
subsequently for Algeria by Rocha (1989).  See these studies for a derivation of the estimated
equation.  We ignore the variable P/P 3 in the estimation as we have no composite index of P 3.
28 The real exchange rate used is based on the official exchange rate, trade-weighted by the
country's  twenty major trading partners, deflated by the world WPI and the domestic CPI.29
Kingdom, 2'  and  the  real  stock  of cedi  assets  on  the  right  hand  side.30  The  resulting
estimate  is reported  as  equation  5.1 in  table  5.  The  model  shows  that  the coefficient
of  the  relative  yield  variable  is  significant  but  that  of  real  money  balance  is
insignificant.  The  significance  of the  relative  yield  variable  implies  that  as  long  &s
real  interest  rates  in  Ghana  diverge  widely  from  world  rates,  there  will  always  be  a
parallel  market  premium.  Exchange  rate  unification  therefore  implies  eventual
opening  up  of  the  capital  account  so that  there  is  legal  arbitrage  between  Ghanaian
cedis  and  foreign  assets.  This  result  highlights  the  important  linkages  between
exchange  rate  management  and  domestic  interest  rates.  Although  a  number  of  other
factors,  such  as  confidence  and  credibility,  offset  movements  in  the  premium,  the
interest  rate  constitutes  an  accessible  policy  instrument  for  influencing  the  exchange
rate  premium.
The  real  exchange  rate  and  the  real  stock  of  domestic  assets  are  insignificant
in  equation  5.1.  The  equation  performs  much  better  when  a  dummy  variable  is
included  for  1978, the  year  in  which  the  cedi's  link  to  the  USS was  severed  and  the
29 The interest  rate differential  was defined as:
(1+i*)(1+e4)/(1+i)  - 1
where i  is the deposit rate on assets held in the United Kingdom, e' is the depreciation of the
official exchange rate in Ghana, and i is the six month deposit rate  in Ghana.  The "official"
e was used until  1978 when an "effective" rate was introduced.  After  1978, this effective rate
was the relevant one for the vast majority of official transactions.  The UK deposit rate  was
chosen because it is widely believed that most Ghanian assets held abrnad are in the UK.
30The use of the relative yield between cedi and UK sterling-demoninated assets to explain
movements in  the cedi-US S premium is valid if the Bank of Ghana did not  maintain broken
cross exchange rates by allowing different growth rates between the cedi/S and cedi/t  premia.
This seems a very plausible assumption since the existence of broken cross exchange rates would
create considerable opportunities  for arbitratage.30
official  exchange  rate  was devalued.  The resulting  estimates  are reported  as equation
5.2  in  table  5.
An additional  factor  that  may explain  the  parallel  market  premium  is  foreign
exchange  reserves  in  terms  of months  of imports.  When foreign  exchange  reserves  are
running  low,  there  is  greater  pressure  on  the  authorities  to  devalue.  When  the
growth  rate  in  foreign  exchange  reserves  in  terms  of  months  of imports  (FXIMPT)  is
included  in  the  model  (equation  5.3) it is  insignificant.  This  does  not  mean  that  the
variable  is totally  irrelevant  to  the evolution  of the  parallel  market  premium.
If  there  is  imperfect  substitutability  between  Ghanaian  cedis  and  foreign
exchange,  the  exchange  rate  premium  is  also  affected  by  uncertainty  about  future
exchange  rates,  inflation  and  government  policies.  While  it is not  possible  to  quantify
much of this  uncertainty  adequately,  the effects  of price  instability  have been explored
empirically.  A  variable  representing  price  volatility  over  time  was  constructed
(PVAR)  using  monthly  consumer  price  indices. 3 In  periods  of  rapid  price  changes,
there  is greater  pressure  on the  authorities  to  devalue  which  results  in  a reduction  of
thc  exchange  rate  differential.  The  inclusion  of  PVAR  also  results  in  the  real
exchange  rate  becoming  significant.  Because  of  the  major  changes  in  the  foreign
exchange  regime,  equation  5.4  was also  estimated  recursively  to  analyze  the  stability
of the  coefficients.  As with  the  inflation  equation,  the one-step  Chow tests  indicated
31The  index used here captures  the  variability  of the  aggregate CPI over  time.  An
alternative is to consider the consequences of variability  of relative prices as in Fischer, 1981.
That approach addresses the question of whether shifts in relative prices as a result of inflation
have negative effects on resource allocation.TatWle :  EXCHANGE RATE PREMIUM EQUATIONS, 1965-88
Equation  Constant  RER  Ry  M2/p  DUM 78  FX/IMPT  PVAR  CHi 2 DW
5.1  -0.5157  -0.0004  0.9992  0.0040  2.87  2.38
(0.74)  (0.17)  (2.56)  (0.63)
5.2  -0.0303  -0.0012  1.1486  -1.8476  8.54  2.33
(0.20)  (0.85)  (4.00)  (4.01)
5.3  -0.2224  1.0525  -1.8490  0.7329  11.07  2.20
(1.11)  (5.51)  (4.34)  (0.66)
5.4  -0.4874  -0.0038  1.3173  -2.4904  1.8525  13.96  1.73
(2.81)  (2.87)  (5.67)  (6.21)  (3.56)
All equations  were estimated by two stage  least squares  using PCGIVE.  The instruments  used were lagged values of the exchange rate
differential,  the real  exchange rate,  relative  yields,  pricc variability,  inflation,  and foreign  exchange as a proportion  of imports.
RER  :  Real Exchange Rate Index ($/Cedis)
Ry  :  Relative Yield between Cedis and UKStg.
DUM78  :  Dummy Variable for  1978
FX  :  Foreign Exchange Reserves in USS
IMPT  :  Import  Bill in USS
PVAR  :  Index of Monthly Variation  in Prices
M2P  :  M2/CPI32
parameter  stability  at  the  1% confidence  level  over  the  sample  period.  These  test
results  imply  that,  despite  the  policy  reforms  that  have  occurred,  some  of  the
underlying  economic  relationships  have  been  captured  in  the  model.
In the case of Ghana,  the  differential  between  the official  and  parallel  market
exchange  rates  was  so  large  that  the  share  of  transactions  that  occurred  through
official  channels  decreased  steadily  over  time.  The  spread  between  the  official  and
parallel  market  exchange  rates  is  depicted  in  nominal  terms  in  figure  3.  Because  of
this  leakage  to  smuggling  and parallel  market  activities,  the efficacy  of the overvalued
official  exchange  rate  as  an  export  tax  diminished.  The  Ghanaian  government's
strategy  was  one  of  a  gradual  reduction  of  the  fiscal  deficit  combined  with  a
relaxation  of  exchange  rationing  and  large,  discrete  devaluations.32  The  reduction
in  the  fiscal  deficit  was  necessary  to  reduce  demand  in  the  economy  and  thereby
reduce  the  rate  of inflation  and  the  rate  of depreciation  of the  parallel  exchange  rate.
The  process  began  in  April  1983,  the  foreign  exchange  auction  was  introduced  in
September  1986 and  a unified  auction  rate  was instituted  in  March  1987.
Figure  4  shows  how  the  growth  in  the  premium  would  have  behaved  in  the
absence  of  changes  in  the  official  exchange  rate  and  domestic  interest  rates.  The
figure  shows that  predominant  effect  of the  narrowing  of  differentials  has  come from
the  official  devaluation,  with  some  additional  effect  due  to  interest  rate  policy.
However,  in  1988, interest  rates  have had  an  adverse  effect  on the exchange  premium.
32  Pinto,  May 1988, p. 21.Figure 3
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A - Actual
B - With PER and interest  rates at 1982 level for 1984  onwards
C - With PER at 1982 level from 1984 onwards.35
3.3.  Block  C:  Monetary-fiscal  Block
Monetary  growth  is  modelled  conventionally  as  a  function  of  the  money
multiplier  and  the  growth  of  reserve  money,  which  in  turn  is  affected  by the  size of
the fiscal  deficit  and  the  manner  in  which  it is financed.  The fiscal  block  is included
in  the  model  to  incorporate  the  effect  of price  changes  on various  elements  of public
expenditure  and  revenue.  Fiscal  revenues  are  a function  of the  exchange  rate,  tax  on
foreign  trade,  and  output.  Government  expenditures  are  disaggregated  between,
wages,  subsidies,  interest  payments,  and  public  investment,  and  other  government
expenditure.  These  components  of  government  expenditure  depend,  in  turn  on
variables  such  as  the  exchange  rate  and  output.  The size  of the  fiscal  deficit  is  thus
the  endogenous  outcome  of government  policy.
Monoy  SUpplY
The  growth  of  broad  money  supply  (M)  is  the  sum  of  the  growth  of  reserve
money  (R)  and  changes  in  the  money  multiplier33 (m)  (Equation  2.13).  Reserve
money is defined  as the  sum of net  foreign  assets  (NFA),  government  borrowing  from
33The mon'ny  multiplier  is defined as the ratio  of broad money to  reserve money:  m =
M/R which can be written as: m = (C+D)/(C+RR+ER); m = (I+c)/(c+r+e); where c is the ratio
of currency (C) to deposits (D), r the ratio of reserves (RR) to deposits and e the ratio of excess
reserves (ER) to deposits.  Changes in any of tnese ratios, such as a shift in government policy
on reserve requirements, can affect the size of the money multiplier.  The behavior of the money
multiplier, depicted in Ap, ^ndix Figure 7, indicates the rise in the currency/deposit ratio after
1983.36
the  reserve  bank  (COO),  and  other  assets  which  include  central  bank  credit  to  banks
and  other  net  assets  (Equation  2.14).  Government  borrowing  from  the  reserve  bank
is last  year's  outstanding  debt  with the reserve bank  (COG-1)  plus new borrowing  from
this  source  (GBB).  Borrowing  from  the  reserve  bank  is treated  as a residual  financing
item,  after  net  foreign  borrowing  (GFB)  and  non-bank  domestic  borrowing  by  the
government  (UDB).
The  Fiscal  Deficit  and  its  Components
The  fiscal  deficit  (GDEF)  is  defined  as  government  expenditure  (GEXP)  less
government  revenue  (GREV).  Government  revenues  (GREV)  are divided  into  customs
duties  (CUDT),  export  taxes  (EXPT),  autonomous  aid  disbursements  (AID)34 and
other  government  revenue  (GOREV).  Customs  duties  (CUDT) are a function  of import
levels  (IMPQ),  foreign  prices,  tariffs  (tm)  and  the  official  exchange  rate  (e¢)
(Equation  2.19)  Simliarly,  export  taxes  are  a function  of  export  levels  (EXPQ),  the
foreign  price  for  exports  (Px),  the  official  exchange  rate  (eo)  and  the  export  tax  rate
(tx)  (Equation  2.20).
Other  government  revenues,  which are essentially  non-trade  tax  receipts,  were
modelled  as a  function  of  nominal  GDP.  The estimated  equation  was:35
4 We treat  autonomous aid disbursements as a revenue item rather than a financing item
because the  value of  aid disbursements have increased  with the  devaluation  of the  official
exchange rate.
35 This equation,  like all of the others unless otherwise indicated, is based on two stage
least squares estimates.37
log  (GOREV)  = -6.1962  +  1.2793 log  (GDP)
(6.41)  (16.15)
DW=  1.74
Chi2  =  5273.62
TSLS
Instruments:  lags  of  government  revenue  and  of  GDP.
Government  expenditure  (GEXP)  was  disaggregated  into  the  wage  bill  (WBILL),
subsidies  and  transfers  to  enterprises  (SUBS),  interest  payments  on  foreign  debt
(INTF)  and  domestic  (INTD)  debt,  public  investment  (GOVI)  and  other  government
expenditure  (GOEXP)  (Equation  2.22).  The  wage  bill  is  defined  as  the  product  of
average  nominal  wages paid  by the government  and  total  public  employment  (Equation
2.23).  The  interest  on  foreign  debt  is  a  function  of  the  stock  of  debt  (FDEBT),
interest  rates  (if)  and  the  exchange  rate  (Equation  2.24).  The  government's  stock  of
foreign  debt  increases  with  new  foreign  borrowing  (GFB).  Analogously,  interest
payments  on  domestic  debt  are  defined  as  the  product  of  the  stock  of  domestic  debt
(DDEBT)  and  the  domestic  interest  rate  (i)  and  the  stock  of  domestic  debt  depends
on new domestic  borrowing  (GDB)  (Equation  2.26-2.27).  Such a  formulation  implies
that  greater  government  borrowing  serves  to  increase  the  domestic  interest  rate  or,
when interest  rates  are controlled,  to  crowd  out  private  borrowing.
Government  investment  is  treated  as  an  exogenous  policy  variable.  Other
government  expenditure  is modelled  as a  function  of nominal  output:36
36 Real import prices were also tried  in the other government expenditure equation  for
Ghana but were not empirically relevant.38
log  (GOEXP)  = -2.5374  + 0.9516  log  (GDP)
(8.20)  (34.03)
DW  =  2.15
Chi2  =  11955.01
TSLS
Instruments:  lags  of government  expenditure  and  of GDP.
Government  expenditure  on  subsidies  and  transfers  reflects  the  difference  between
controlled  and  market  prices  as  well  as  operating  losses  of  the  enterprises.  It  also
includes  social  security  payments.  The size of government  transfers  as a  share  of GDP
is depicted  in  Figure  5. The graph  depicts  the  sharp  rises  in subsidy  expenditure  in the
1970s  and  the  relative  decline  during  the  more  austere  1980s.  Econometricaily,
transfers  and  subsidies  as  a  share  of  GDP  (SUB/GDP)  have  been  modelled  as  a
function  of  agricultural  output  (GDPAG)  and  the  import  price  index  relative  to  the
GDP  deflator  (PMI/YDEF):"
log(SUB/GDP)  = -3.0443-0.2452  log(GDPAG)+0.92581og(PMI/YDEF)(-I)
(3.72)  (3.13)  (3.96)
DW  1.76
Chi2  =  792.14
TSLS
Instruments:  lags  of  GDP  in  agriculture,  subsidics  as  a share  of GDP,  and  import
prices  as a  ratio  of the  GDP  deflator.
3  Other variables that were tried but were found to be insignificant were: the difference
between urban and rural consumer price indices for a variety of commodities, GDP, and price
variability.Figure  5
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The negative  relationship  between  agricultural  output  and subsidies  shows that  the
government  attempted  to  cushion  the  effects  of  food  price  inflation  due  to  droughts.
This  cushion  constitutes  a  greater  burden  for  the  government  subsidy  bill  when  the
relative  price  of imports  is  greater  than  domestic  prices.
3.4.  Block  D:  The  Real  Side:  Investment  and  Output
In order  to  explore  the  consequences  of  price  dynamics  for  the  real  side  of the
economy,  a  simple  model  of  output  and  investment  determination  was estimated  for
Ghana.  In  addition,  an export  function  is defined  to  analyze  the interact-on  between
exchange  rates,  the  balance  of payments  and  inflation.
Exports  are  hypothesized  to  be  a  function  of  the  real  exchange  rate,
agricultural  output,  and  lagged  exports:
log(EXPT)  = -3.4206  - 0.2560  log(RER)(-I)
(0.94)  (1.67)
+  1.0286  log(GDPAG)(-I)  + 0.7978  log(EXPT)'-I)
(1.35)  (3.38)
DW =  2.02
R2 = 0.58,  OLSQ.41
The  equation  indicates  a  relatively  low  short  run  elasticity  of  exports  of  about  0.26
with  respect  to  the  real  exchange  rate.36  This  is  not  surprising  given  the  long
gestation  periods  associated  with  some of Ghana's  major  exports  - cocoa  and  forestry
products.  Note  also  that  the  long-run  elasticity  of  real  exports  to  the  real  exchange
rate  in Ghana  is about  1. This  is  a very  plausible  number  and  close  to  that  obtained
in  numerous  studies  on  export  elasticities. 3"
Output  is  hypothesized  to  be  determined  by  a  Cobb-Douglas  production
function:
y  =  A.  K'.  L2
Assuming  constant  returns  to  scale  and  rearranging,
log  (Y/L)  = ao + a,  log  (K/L)
which  relates  the  productivity  of  labor  to  the  capital-labor  ratio.
For  empirical  estimation,  it  was  assumed  that  the  participation  rate  was
constant  over  the  period  so that  the  population  could  serve  as a proxy  for  the  labour
force.  The  empirical  estimate  of  this  production  function  using  TSLS was:
log  (Y/L)  =  1.7052  + 0.4481  log  (K/L)
(6.44)  (7.47)
DW = 0.68
Chi2(B=O)  = 27313.41
TSLS
Note  that  a  rise  in  the  real  exchange rate  index measures an  appreciation.  This
explains  the  negative coefficient  in  the  regression.  The inclusion  of  agricultural  output,
although not  strictly  significant, improves the performance of the real exchange rate  variable
as well as the overall equation.  Thus, it was kept in the model.
39See Balassa (1985) and Chhibber et al (1989) for Zimbabwe.42
Instruments:  lags  of  the  capital-labor  ratio,  output-labor  ratio,  and  deviation  of
output  from  trend.
The capital-labor  ratio  is significant  and  appropriately  signed.  The coefficient
implies  that  the  share  of  capital  in  output  is  approximately  45 percent.
A number  of  different  models  of  investment  determination  were  tested  on  the
data  for  Ghana.  Because  of the  numerous  shocks  to  the economy,  the  absence  of any
real  growth  during  much of the  period,  and  the  existence  of considerable  uncertainty,
the  private  investment  rate  was  fairly  volatile  (see  Appendix  Figure  8).  In  addition,
the data  for  private  investment,  which  is  derived  as  the  difference  between  aggregate
investment,  which  is  estimated  largely  on  the  basis  of  imports  and  government
investment,  may  not  be  very  reliable.  In  particular,  the  private  investment  series
displays  a sharp  drop  in  1976 that  is difficult  to explain.  Nevertheless,  the  following
equation  provides  a  plausible  explanation  of the  determinants  of  private  investment
over  the  period:
PRIVID=  9.7888  + 0.5785(PCRED)  - 21.2118(DUM76)
(3.50)  (3.08)  (4.93)
DW =  1.46
CHI2  = 97.38.
TSLS.
Instruments:  lags  of  private  investment  and  of private  credit.43
This  implies  that  investment  is  a  function  of  the  real  quantity  of credit  available  to
the private  sector  and  a dummy variable  to capture  the unusual  collapse  of investment
in  1976.  The  quantity  of credit  reflects  the  rationing  that  occurs  under  administered
interest  rates.  The  irrelevance  of  the  interest  rate  to  investment  determination  was
verified  economeirically.  The elasticity  of private  investment  to  the real  private  credit
is about  0.58.  This  implies  that  a  ten  percent  reduction  in  real  credit  to  the  private
sector  will  result  in  a  5.8  percent  decline  in  real  private  investment.  This  is a  -very
sizable  impact  and  has  obvious  implications  for  the  design  of  a  program  oriented
towards  the  recovery  of  private  investment.
In  some  countries  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  government
investment,  and  private  capital  formation. 4'  When  this  was  tested  econometrically
in  Ghana,  the  results  indicated  insignificant  effects  resulting  from  government
42 investment  both  in  the  aggregate  and  in  infrastructure.  This  apparent  absence  of
complementarity,  or  "crowding  in,"  between  public  and  private  capital  formation
should  be  an  area  for  concern  in  planning  future  public  investment  programs,
especially  at  a  time  when capital  formation  is constrained.
For empirical evidence on Korea, India,  Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, and a number of
other countries, see Sundarajan and Thakur, 1980; Tun Wai and Wong, 1982; Blejer and Khan,
1984; Chhibber and van Wijnbergen, 1988; Shafik, 1989.
42  Government investment  in  infrastructure  was defined  as  the  sum  of  development
expenditure on community services, fuel and power, and transportation.44
4.  oiIju
The  model  is used  to  examine  three  sets  of policy  issues.  First,  we address  the
major  criticism  of  adjustment  programs  that  they  rely  excessively  on  nominal
devaluations  and  that  they  ignore  constraints  to  effective  implementation  of  this
policy  in  the  African  context.  Second,  we  examine  growth  and  inflationary
implications  of  alternate  credit  and  monetary  programs.  Finally,  we look  at  some  of
the  trade-offs  of  the  government's  subsidy  policies  designed  to  protect  vulnerable
consumers  and  firms  during  adjustment.
4.1.  Exchange  Rate  Policy.
The  econometric  results  presented  in  Section  3  showed  that  a  I  percent
devaluation  leads  to  about  .14-.16  percent  immediate  increase  in inflation  . The long-
run  effects  are  even  larger  because  of  the  important  role  of  lagged  expectations.  To
recapitulate  the  lagged  inflation  variable  was highly  significant  with  a coefficient  of
about  0.5.  This  implies  that  if  the  short  run  effect  of  exchange  rate  devaluation  is
about  0.15  the  long-run  effect  would  be twice  that  or  about  0.30.
These  are  the  effects  on  inflation  of  movements  in  the  free  market  exchange
rate.  The Ghanaian  story  is somewhat  more  complicated  because  the  official  rate  has
been catching  up to  the  parallel  market  rate  and  this  has  had  budgetary  implications.
In Ghana,  the  devaluation  of the official  rate  led to  budgetary  improvements  in  recent
years  since  the  government  is  a  net  supplier  of  foreign  exchange  to  the  economy.  In45
addition  the devaluations  reduced the large subsidy to  those importers  with access to
foreign exchange at the official exchange rate.  Although the subsidy to importers was
reduced,  the government did not  transfer  all  of the gains to exporters.  Part  went to
the  Government  as windfall  revenue gains,  especially from cocoa.  In  addition,  the
devaluation  of the  official  rate  meant  that  a larger  proportion  of foreign  exchange
transactions  occurred  through  official  channels.  Moreover,  the  devaluation  of the
official rate did not result in an immediate increase in prices through a cost-push  type
mechanism because the pricing of products already reflects the shadow cost of foreign
exchange except for the  few items where the  government has some direct control  on
pricing.  This is a crucial reason why the exchange rate  unification  in Ghana between
1984 and  1988 a  rise  in  inflation  as  was discussed in  the  theoretical  discussion  in
Section 2.
In order to  quantify these effects the model in Section 3 was simulated with a
slower official  exchange rate depreciation  in the period 1984-1988 so that  the official
rate was 25% less depreciated than the actual  outcome. The results  of this  simulation
show that  the  parallel  exchange rate  would have depreciated  faster  than  the  actual
case (see Figure 6).  This implies that  the exchange premium increases.  The cost of
such a policy would be lower growth as the higher fiscal  deficit arising from slower
exchange rate adjustment  would result  in higher government borrowing which would
squeeze out  private  investment.
One would expect lower inflation  in  the  simulation  as the  parallel  exchange
rate depreciates more slowly. In fact, because of lower growth, inflation  turns  out to46
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be  higher  under  this  formulation  averaging  29.3  percent  per  annum  as  against  27.8
percent  per  annum  in  the base  case during  1983-88.  The net outcome  is lower  growth,
a  larger  public  debt,  higher  inflation  and  a  more  overvalued  official  exchange  rate.
This  result  is  counter-intuitive  and  is  due  to  three  factors:  (a)  the  official
devaluations  did  not  have  a  cost-push  effect  as  prices  had  already  adjusted  to  the
parallel  exchange  rate;  (b)  the  devaluation  had  a  positive  budgetary  effect  and
therefore  did  not  fuel  inflation,  as a result,  a substantial  real  devaluation  took  place
which  narrowed  the  premium;  and  (c)  relative  yields  of cedis  versus  foreign  exchange
improved  because  the  large  official  devaluation  reduced  expectations  of  future
devaluation.  A key  to  the  budgetary  improvement  was  the  large  amount  of  official
foreign  exchange  inflows  which  came  in  to  support  the  policy  reforms  and  was  not
disbursed  at  a  more  depreciated  exchange  rate.  In  summary,  this  section  has  shown
that  the  devaluations  could  not  explain  the  high  and  persistent  inflation  in  Ghana
since  the  reforms  and  particularly  since  1986.
4.2.  Monetary  and  Credit  Policy
The  inflation  equation  (Table  4,  Equation  4.1)  identifies  the  key  role  of
monetary  growth  in  determining  the  rate  of  inflation  in  the  system.  The  short  run
elasticity  of  inflation  with  respect  to  real  money balances  is  about  0.4  and  the  long-
run  steady  state  elasticity  is  1.0. This  implies  that  a  1% increase  in  monetary  growth
will,  with  lagged  effects,  result  in  1% higher  inflation,  ceteris  paribus.  Monetary
growth  averaged  over  42 percent  per  annum  between  1983-1988.  Therefore  monetary
policy  must  be  an  important  component  of  any  anti-inflationary  package.  A48
breakdown  of base  money growth  shows that  the predominant  factor  behind  monetary
growth  has been  the rise  in net  foreign  assets  (NFA).  This  raises  the issue  of why the
increase  in  NFA  has  not  been sterilized  by the  monetary  authorities  and  whether  the
huge  increase  in foreign  aid strained  the absorptive  capacity  of the Ghanian  economy.
Fiscal  policy  has a limited  role to play  in addressing  current  inflationary  issues.
Simulations  show  that  a  10 percent  cut  from  actual  levels  in  currert  government
expenditures  during  1984-1988  would  have led  to  some  reduction  in  monetary  growth
and  inflation,  but  not  by a large  magnitude.  The average  inflation  rate  for  the period
drops  from  27.8  percent  per  annum  to  26.1  percent  per  annum.  Current  expenditures
went  up  from  8.6  per  cent  of  GDP  in  1984 to  11.9 percent  of  GDP  in  1986 but  have
since  declined  to  10.2  per  cent  of  GDP.  A large  part  of the  increase  is due  to  rising
interest  payments  which  increased  sharply  in  1986  (see  Table  1).  This  is  a  non-
discretionary  part  of  government  expenditure.  Other  components  of  government
expenditure  did  not  increase  much,  implying  that  the  option  to  cut  current
expenditures  to  reduce  inflation  is  iimited.  Public  sector  wages  have  been  cut  to
levels  that  now  seriously  undermine  public  sector  productivity.  Without  a  major
restructuring  of  the  civil  service  possibly  further  retrenchment  and  a  revision  of  the
pay  scales  the  wage  bill  cannot  be squeezed  further.
The other  option  would  be  to  cut  public  investment  but  this  is a  double-edged
sword.  Cutting  public  investment  reduces  the  fiscal  deficit  and  monetary  growth,  but
it  also  lowers  overall  economic  growth.  Public  investment  grew from  a  very  low level
of 2.5  percent  of  GDP  in  1984 to  8.3 percent  of GDP  in  1988.  The growth  in public49
capital  formation  is almost  entirely  responsible  for the recovery  in  Ghana's  investment
rate  to  12.5 per  cent  of GDP in  1988.  Private  investment  has  played  a relatively  small
part  in  Ghana's  recovery  in  this  period  and  remains  a  weak  point  in  Ghana's
adjustment  program.  Our  model  results  show  that  the  availability  of  credit  to  the
private  sector  is  a  key constraint  in  determining  the  level  of private  investment.
In  order  to  quantify  the  trade-offs  between  public  investment,  growth  and
inflation  we carried  out  two simulations.  In the  first,  public  investment  is cut  by  10
percent  froni  base  year  levels  with  the reduced  fiscal  deficit  leading  to  lower  monetary
growth.  In  the,  second,  public  investment  is  cut  by  10  percent,  as  in  the  first
simulation,  but  the  reduced  fiscal  deficit  leads  to  lower  public  sector  borrowing.  The
level  of total  credit  is left  unchanged  so that  the extra  credit  is made available  to  the
private  sector  which  in  our  model  results  in  higher  private  investment.
In  the  first  simulation  the  benefits  of  lower  monetary  growth  are  marginal.
There  is  a clear  trade-off  between  lower  monetisation  and  growth.  The  net  effect  on
inflation  is  marginal  and  it  comes  at  the  cost  of  lower  growth  as  the  reduction  in
public  investment  is not offset  by increasing  private  investment.  The second  simulation
leads  to  higher  growth  than  in  the base  case with  some reduction  in  inflation.  There
are  two reasons  for  this.  First,  the lower public  investment  reduces  the public  sector's
borrowing  requirements  and  releases  credit  for the  private  sector.  Second,  as the level
of public  sector  borrowing  declines,  future  interest  payments  on public  sector  debt  are
reduced.  The  cumulative  effect  of  reduced  interest  payments  further  lowers  public
sector  borrowing  requirements  thereby  releasing  more  credit  to  the  private  sector.so
This  second  simulation  shows a "virtuous  circle"  that  results  from  reducing  the
public  sector's  borrowing  requirement.  The added  effect  of reduced  interest  payments
to  the  cut  in  the  "primary  deficit"  results  in  increases  in  credit  to  the  private  sector
which  have a net effect  of increasing  private  investment  by more than  the cut  in public
investment,  leading  to  higher  and  more  balanced  growth.  The  crucial  element  is the
recovery  in  private  investment  which  has  been  held  back  by  the  public  sector's
borrowing  requirements,  despite  the  introduction  of  a  very  significant  adjustment
program.
4.3.  Food  Prices.  Subsidies  and  Inflation
How much of the inflation  in  1983 was due  to  the drought  in Ghana  during  that
year?  This  is important  because  if  the lagged  effects  of that  drought  led  to  the  high
and  persistant  inflation,  then  that  inflation  needed  to  be  accommodated.  Trying  to
control  that  inflation  would only  imply an unwarranted  credit  squeeze  and a recession.
The  mechanism  for  a  drought  to  affect  inflation  in  our  model  is  not  through  the
standard  cost-push  effect  of higher  food prices,  on  wages and  overall  prices.  We have
shown  in  Section  3 (Block  A) that  wage-push  inflation  was not  important  in  Ghana.
In our  model  the impact  of drought  is felt  through  its  impact  on the budget  and
through  its  impact  on  overall  output.  In  Section  2  we  established  the  negative
relationship  between  the  level  of  agricultural  output  and  the  ratio  of  transfers  and
subsidies  to  GDP.  A drought  also  lowers  real  output  in  the  economy  and  therebyS1
lowers  money  demand.  As  a  result,  we  get  higher  inflation  for  the  same  level  of
money  supply.
A simulation  of  the  model  was run  to  show  the  effects  of  the  counterfactual
of  no  drought  in  1983.43  The  results  showed  that  the  1983  drougnt  compounded
Ghana's  problems  by adding  to the  adjustments  required  in the  face of external  shocks
and  structural  weaknesses  in  the  economy.  The  economy  would  have  required  a
smaller  adjustment  had  the drought  not  occurred.  The real  exchange  rate  would  have
still  appreciated  had  agricultural  production  levels  been  maintained  at  pre-drought
levels,  but  not  by  as  much  as  it  did.  Growth  would  have  been  higher  and  most
importantly  the  level  of  domestic  and  foreign  debt  woul-i  have  been  lower.  As  a
result,  one  can  presume  thqt  Ghana  would  have  been  in  a  better  position  to
accomodate  future  adjustments.  A.verage inflation  would  also  have been lower  because
the  significant  food  p;ice  inflation  Ghana  witnessed  in  1983 would  not  have occurred.
Nevertheless,  the  simulations  show  that  the pattern  of rising  inflation  that  Ghana  has
witnessed  since  1986 would  have  persisted  since  it  was based  on  monetary  growth  in
the  later  period  (Figure  7).
43Agricultural  output  was brought  up to  trend in  1983 and overall output  was adjusted
accordingly.52
Figure  7:  CPI  INFLATION  WITH  AND  WITHOUT  DROUGHT
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4.4.  Prospects  for  the  Future
In  the  medium-term,  there  are  three  objectives  for  future  monetary-exchange
rate  policy  which  are  interrelated:  (a)  complete  unification  of the  exchange  markets,
(b)  reduction  of  monetary  growth  to  control  inflation  without  hurting  growth,  (c)
revival  of private  investment.  A fuller  discussion  of  these  could  be  the  subject  of  a
separate  paper,  on  the  financial  system  in  Ghana  and  its  problems.  But  the  model
used  in  this  paper  shows  the  interactions  between  these  objectives  and  it  is  useful  to
mention  these  interactions.
The three  policy  objectives  are critically  dependent  on changes  in the  financial
system  in Ghana.  Full  unification  of exchange  rates  will require  further  liberalisation
of interest  rates  to  achieve  parity  in  yields.  Without  the  parity,  there  will  be capital53
flight,  including  from the  foreign assistance  that  Ghana receives.  There is evidence
that  the financial  system is unwilling to accept deposits even at the present negative
real deposit rates,  while at the same time parts of the private  sector are unable to get
sufficient  credit  for both  long term investment as well as credit  for working capital.
Financial  sector  reform  aimed  at  reducing  the  cost  of financial  intermediation
will therefore  raise  deposit  rates  and  increase financial  savings in  cedis.  This  will
achieve  three  objectives:  (a)  reduce  interest  rate  differentials  between  cedis  and
foreign  exchange  and  facilitate  the  full  unification  of  the  parallel  and  official
exchange markets;  (b) reduce inflation  by increasing the desire to  hold cedis; and (c)
channel  more  savings  into  the  financial  system  to  meet  the  working  capital  and
investment  needs  of  the  private  sector.  At  the  same time  monetary  growth  can  also
be  reduced  by  greater  efforts  at  resource  mobilization.  Current  revenues  could  be
raised  from  present  levels  of  about  12%  of  GDP  to  about  15%  of  GDP  with
expenditures  remaining  at present  levels.
.9~~~~~~~~~
5.  Conclusions
kThis  paper  has  u  d  a  theoretical  framework  to  analyze  the  issue  of
exchange rate  reform in the  presence of parallel  markets.  The  /s  ppied  V
to  ;exa.vuethe  G  iaiQn  efoprnsm  The results  address,  among  other  things,  a  central
criticism  of  adjustment  programs  in  Africa,  i.e.,  their  excessive  reliance  on  the
exchange  rate  as  a  tool  to  bring  about  relative  price  adjustments  in  the  economy.54
This  is alleged  to  be excessively  inflationary.  In the case  of Ghana,  which  has  carried
out  one  of the  most  thorough  adjustment  programs  in Africa  which  has  included  very
large  adjustments  in  the  official  exchange  rate,  high  inflation  was  and  continues  to
be  a problem.
However,  the  recent  inflationary  surge  in  Ghana  is  not  due  to  the  exchange
reforms.  The empirical  results  for  Ghana  shows that  the official  devaluations  had  no
direct  effect  on consumer  price  inflation.  If  anything,  the  official  devaluations  had  a
positive  budgetary  effect  which was anti-inflationary.  Statistical  tests  show that  both
before  and  after  1983 the  relevant  exchange  rate  for  pricing  decisions  was the  shadow
price  of foreign  exchange  represented  by the  parallel  exchange  rate.  The  devaluation
of  the  official  rate,  therefore,  was  not  inflationary  in  Ghana  since  prices  already
reflected  the  more  depreciated  shadow  exchange  rate.  In  fact,  a  slower  devaluation
according  to  our  model  simulations  would  have  led  to  higher  depreciation  of  the
parallel  exchange  rate  and  higher  inflation.
The  theoretical  and  empirical  models  also  address  the  determinants  of  the
exchange  premium.  rhe  model  explains  differential  growth  of  the  parallel  and  the
official  rate  as a function  of the  official  real  exchange  rate  , interest  rate  differentials
and  uncertainty.  Devaluation  of  the  official  rate  leads  to  narrowing  of  the
diffei  ntials.  Similatrly,  ieduction  in  the  relative'  yiela  through  eithrr  u*pward
movement  of  domestic  interest  rates  or  through  reduction  in  the  expectation  of  a
devaluation  has  also  leads  to  narrowing  of the  exchange  rate  premium.55
The  improvement  in  the  budgetary  position  of  the  government  in  response  to
official  devaluation  requires  some explanation.  Traditionally,  Ghana  relied  heavily  on
export  taxes,  particularly  on  cocoa".  This  taxation  was  carried  out  through  direct
tax levies  and,  more  importantly,  through  an  overvalued  exchange  rate  which lowered
the  real  price  received  by exporters.  A large  part  of this  tax  went  to  importers,  which
included  public  enterprises,  as  an  exchange  rate  subsidy.  With  the  devaluation,  this
tax  returned  to  the  government,  a part  of which  was given  back  to  exporters  through
higher  producer  prices.  Another  crucial  factor  was the  heavy  inflow  of concessional
assistance  in  support  of the  program.45 Between  1984-1988 Ghana  received  an  average
of  almost  5 percent  of GDP  in  foreign  concessional  assistance.  This  has  significant
lessons  for  exchange  rate  reforms  in Africa  which  can  be destabilising  where  there  is
not  adequate  funding  of the adjustment  program.  It  is useful  to contrast  the Ghanaian
experience  with  the  Zambian  reforms  where  an  important  factor  responsible  for  the
unravelling  of the  introduction  of the exchange  rate  auction  was the under-funding  of
the program.46
The  size  of  the  initial  devaluation  also  made  a  difference.  The  official
devaluation  had  no  visibly  significant  impact  on prices  but  it  led to  a depreciation  of
the  real  exchange  rate,  thereby  reducing  the  exchange  rate  premium  and  slowing  the
depreciation  in  the  parallel  exchange  rate.  The government's  interest  rate  policy  also
"For  evidence see the World Development Report 1986, and Mansfield, 1980.
4'See  Leechor (1989) "  Ghana's  Adjustment Program "  in Thomas, Chhibber, Dailami and
de Melo ed. ' Structural  Adjustment and the World Bank ',  World Bank manuscript.
"See  Fardi (1989) "Zambia's Adjustment Program", in Thomas, Chhibber, Dailami and de
Melo ed.  ' Structural  Adjustment and the World Bank,' World Bank manuscript.56
played an important  supporting  role in narrowing returns  between cedi holdings and
foreign  assets.  The  reforms  worked  because  of  a  coherent  package  of  policies
supported  by adequate foreign financing.  This is the  central  lesson from the  Ghana
experience that  exchange rate  policy is  a  key instrument  of reforms  but  requires  a
coherent  set of supporting  policies to  make it successful.
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